Abstract. Elimination of nuisance parameters is a central problem in statistical inference and has been formally studied in virtually all approaches to inference. Perhaps the least studied approach is elimination of nuisance parameters through integration, in the sense that this is viewed as an almost incidental byproduct of Bayesian analysis and is hence not something which is deemed to require separate study. There is, however, considerable value in considering integrated likelihood on its own, especially versions arising from default or noninformative priors. In this paper, we review such common integrated likelihoods and discuss their strengths and weaknesses relative to other methods.
INTRODUCTION
Rarely is the entire parameter w of interest to the
I Preliminaries and Notation
analyst. It is common to select a parameterization w = (0, A ) of the statistical model in a way that simIn elementary statistical problems, we try to plifies the study of the "parameter of interest," here make inferences about an unknown state of nature denoted 0, while collecting any remaining paramew (assumed to lie within some set il of possible ter specification into a "nuisance parameter" A. states of nature) upon observing the value X = x In this paper we review certain of the ways that of some random vector X = {XI, . . . , X,) whose have been used or proposed for eliminating the nuiprobability distribution is determined completely sance parameter A from the analysis to achieve by w. If X has a density function f(xlw), strong some sort of "likelihood" L * ( 0 ) for the parameter arguments reviewed and extended in Berger and of interest. We will focus on integration methods, Wolpert (1988) and Bjgrnstad (1996) suggest that such as eliminating A by simple integration (with inference about w ought to depend upon X only respect to Lebesgue measure), resulting in the through the likelihood function L ( w ) = f ( x l w ) uniform-integrated likelihood which is to be viewed as a function of w for the given data x.
In justifying integration methods, we will occasionJames 0. Berger is Arts and Sciences Professor and ally refer to alternative maximization methods, such Robert L. Wolpert is Associate Professor at the Instias the profile likelihood tute of Statistics and Decision Sciences, Duke University, Box 90251, Durham, North Carolina 27708-0251 (e-mail: berger@stat.duke.edu and rwolpert@ stat.duke.edu (N(p, a2) ). Suppose the parameter of interest is a2 while p is a nuisance parameter.
(Thus, in the above notation, 0 = a2 and A = p.) Here, easy computations yield note that : is the conditional mle. Since proportionality constants do not matter for likelihoods, LU(a2) and L(a2) differ only in the powers of a2in the denominators.
Notationally, we will write integrated likelihoods as where r(Al0) is the "weight function7' for A. (In this paper, we consider only examples with continuous A taking values in Euclidean space, and consider only integration with respect to Lebesgue measure.) It is most natural to use Bayesian language, and call r(Al0) the "conditional prior density of A given 0," although much of the paper will focus on nonsubjective choices of r(A16). Also, we will have occasion to refer to a prior density, .rr(O), for the parameter of interest 0. As is commonly done, we will abuse notation by letting the arguments define the prior; thus ~ ( 6 ) is the prior for 6, while r(A) would be the (marginal) prior for A.
Background and Preview
The elimination of nuisance parameters is a central but difficult problem in statistical inference. It has formally been addressed only in this century since, in the nineteenth century Bayes-Laplace school of "Inverse Probability" (see, e.g., Zabell, 1989) , the problem was not of particular concern; use of the uniform integrated likelihood LU(6) was considered "obvious."
With the Fisher and Neyman rejection of the Bayes-Laplace school, finding alternative ways to eliminate nuisance parameters was felt to be crucial. Student's derivation of the sampling distribution of the mean of a normal population when the variance is unknown and the derivation of the distribution of the sample correlation coefficient of a bivariate normal population (Fisher, 1915 (Fisher, , 1921 , are probably the first examples of a frequentist approach to the problem. Both were based on derivation of a pivotal quantity whose distribution is free of the nuisance parameters. Other famous examples include the Bartlett (1937) test of homogeneity of variances and the various solutions of the Behrens-Fisher problem (Fisher, 1935) .
There have been numerous efforts to create a likelihood approach to elimination of nuisance parameters (Barnard, Jenkins and Winston, 1962) . The beginnings of the "modern" likelihood school can perhaps be traced to Kalbfleisch and Sprott (1970, 1974) , who proposed systematic study of a variety of methods for eliminating nuisance parameters (including integrated likelihood) and opened the way to a rich field of research.
Probably the simplest likelihood approach to eliminating nuisance parameters is to replace them with their conditional maximum likelihood estimates, leading to the profile likelihood in (2); this can then be used as an ordinary likelihood. Many examples of misleading behavior of the profile likelihood (Neyman and Scott, 1948; Cruddas, Cox and Reid, 1989) have given rise to various "corrections" of the profile, which aim to account for the "error" in simply replacing A by a point estimate. Among the advances in this area are the modified profile likelihood (Barndorff-Nielsen, 1983 ) and the conditional profile likelihood (Cox and Reid, 1987) . These methods were primarily developed to provide higher-order asymptotic approximations to (conditional) sampling distributions of statistics of interest, such as the maximum likelihood estimator or the likelihood ratio. As a by-product, these approximate distributions can be interpreted as likelihood functions for the parameter of interest and/or used in a frequentist spirit via tail area approximations. However, use of these methods tends to be restricted to rather special frameworks (e.g., exponential families or transformation groups). Excellent references include Reid (1995 Reid ( , 1996 , Fraser and Reid (1989) ; see also Sweeting (1995a Sweeting ( , b, 1996 for a Bayesian version of these approaches. A different way to adjust the profile likelihood, based on the properties of the score function, is developed in McCullagh and Tibshirani (1990) .
Other likelihood approaches arise when one or more components of the sufficient statistics have marginal or conditional distributions which depend on 0, but not on A. In these cases, such distributions are often used as the likelihood for 0, and are called the "marginal likelihood" or the "conditional likelihood." Basu (1977) gives an interesting example of conflicting marginal and conditional likelihoods for the same problem, indicating that use of these techniques is likely to remain somewhat arbitrary.
Marginal and conditional likelihoods are special cases of the more general partial likelihood (Cox, 1975) . If there exists a partition (y, z) of the data x, such that then the terms hf in (4) or hf in (5) are ignored, and the remaining factor is taken as the partial likelihood for 0. Since the ignored term does depend on 0, there is some loss of information. Supporters of the approach suggest, however, that one loses only the information about 0 which is inextricably tied with the unknown parameter A. Basu (Ghosh, 1988, page 319) criticizes the idea of partial likelihood on the ground that it usually cannot be interpreted in terms of sampling distributions, and one is left only with the possibility of exploring the shape of the particular observed partial likelihood.
From a subjective Bayesian point of view, the problem has a trivial solution: simply integrate the joint posterior with respect to the nuisance parameters and work with the resulting marginal posterior distribution of 0. From a philosophical or foundational level, it would be difficult to add much to the fascinating articles (Basu, 1975 (Basu, , 1977 comparing subjective Bayesian and likelihood methods for elimination of nuisance parameters. There is, however, considerable resistance to general implementation of subjective Bayesian analysis, centering around the fact that elicitation of a subjective prior distribution for multiple parameters can be quite difficult; this is especially so for nuisance parameters, whose choice and interpretation are often ambiguous.
Even if one is not willing to entertain subjective Bayesian analysis, we feel that use of integrated likelihood is to be encouraged. The integration must then be with respect to default or noninformative priors. Our main goal will thus be to discuss and illustrate integrated likelihood methods based on different choices of conditional noninformative priors for the nuisance parameters.
In Section 2, we argue in favor of the use of integrated likelihood on the grounds of simplicity, generality, sensitivity and precision. In Section 3, we will illustrate the uses and interpretations of integrated likelihood in various conditional approaches to inference, ranging from the pure likelihood to the fully Bayesian viewpoints. Section 4 reviews the various integrated likelihoods that have been considered; these primarily arise from different definitions of conditional noninformative priors for the nuisance parameters. The last section focuses on criticisms and limitations of integration methods.
Throughout the paper, we will repeatedly use several examples to illustrate and compare different methods. Several of these examples (Examples 4 and 7, in particular) are simple to state but of near impossible difficulty to analyze, in the sense that default methods of any type are questionable. In these examples at least, we will thus be asking effectively, "What is the best method of doing the impossible?" While firm conclusions cannot then be forthcoming, we feel that consideration of such extreme examples can greatly aid intuition.
Some Philosophical Issues
In this section we discuss several issues that are somewhat tangential to the main theme, but relate to overall perspective. Bayarri, DeGroot and Kadane (1988) argued that there can be no unique definition of a "likelihood function," rejecting as incomplete the usual (and usually vague) definitions such as the one Savage (1976) attributes to Fisher: "probability or density of the observation as a function of the parameter."
What is the likelihood function?
Such definitions give no guidance as to how to treat the value of an unobserved variable (for example, a future observation z): should we condition on it, as we do for unknown parameters, leading to what Bayarri, DeGroot and Kadane (1988) call the "observed" likelihood Lobs(O, Z) = f ( x 0, z)?
Or should we treat it like other observations, leading to the "random variable" likelihood L,,(O, z) = f (x, z O)? They argue that likelihood-based inference will depend on this choice and offer examples illustrating that either choice may be the best one in different examples.
Here, we avoid this difficulty by assuming that the problem begins with a specified likelihood function of the form where (as before) x is the observed value of the data vector X, and O* and A* are unobserved variables of interest and nuisance variables, respectively, having probability distributions as specified by f . The vector O* could include a future observation z or some "random effects" that are of interest, for example; thus any variables with known (conditional) distribution are put to the left of the bar, while those without given distributions are placed on the right. Following Butler (1988) we recommend immediate removal (by integration) of the nuisance variable A*, passing to (6) f (x, 6' 1 6, A) = / f (x, 0*, A* 1 0, A)dA*; this then would be the likelihood we study, seeking to eliminate A. [In most of our examples "O*" will be absent and so we will just write f(xl6, A).] This elimination of A* by integration is noncontroversial, and should be acceptable to most statistical schools. See Bjarnstad (1996) for additional discussion. EXAMPLE 2. Random effects. Let X, be independent N(pi, 1) random variables, with unobseived means pi drawn in turn independently from the N(5, r2) distribution; we wish to make inference about 0 = (5, r2), ignoring the nuisance parameter A* = p = ( p l , . . . ,p,) (the random effects). Here, (6) becomes (with no 0* or A present)
where : is the sample mean and s2 = C (xi -T ) ' /~. Again, most statistical schools would accept elimination of p by integration here; for instance, the usual alternative of maximizing over the unobserved parameters pi would lead instead to the profile likelihood
which differs from L(0) by having a singularity at r = 0 that strongly (and wrongly) suggests that any data support an inference that r2 = 0. In situations such as this it is often suggested that one use a local maximum of the likelihood. Interestingly, no local maximum exists if s2 < 4. Even if s2 >_ 4, the local maximum is an inconsistent estimator of r2 as p i-a; for instance, if r2 = 3, the local maximum will converge to 1 as p + oo. Figure 1indi cates the considerable difference between the likelihoods; graphed, for p = 6, s2 = 4 and : = .$ are L(r2) = f(x1r2, 5 = T ) and e(r2,:). Note that we have "maximized over .$ to eliminate that parameter for display purposes. Had we integrated over 5 in f (xi O), the difference would have been even more pronounced.
1.3.2 The subjective Bayesian integrated likelihood. Since integrated likelihood methods can be viewed in a Bayesian light, it is useful to review the purist Bayesian position. For subjective Bayesians there is no ambiguity concerning how to treat nuisance parameters: all inference is based on the joint distribution f(x, 6, A) of all parameters and variables, whether or not observed, which can be constructed from any of the conditional data distributions along with appropriate subjective prior distributions. In problems without nuisance parameters, for example, the joint density is f (x, 6) = f (xl0).rr(0), the product of the likelihood and the prior distribution 4 0 ) for 6; in this setting, Bayes' theorem is simply the conditional probability calculation that the posterior density for 0 is
In the presence of a nuisance parameter A, a subjective Bayesian will base the analysis on a full prior .rrB(O, A), which can also be factored as .rrB(6, A) = .rrB(0).rrB(Al 0), the product of the marginal and conditional prior densities of 6 and A (given 01, respectively. The subjective Bayesian still seeks ~( 0 1~) and would accept an integrated likelihood L(6) if it satisfied ~( 0 1~) cx L(6).rrB(0). It is easy to see that the only L(6) which satisfies this relationship is given (up to a multiplicative constant) by This thus defines the unique integrated likelihood that would be acceptable to a subjective Bayesian. . . . , ( B (~) , from the full posterior distribution ~( 0 , Alx); inferences concerning 8 then follow from direct use of the simulated values dl),. . . , (e.g., the usual estimate of 8 would be the average of these simulated values). There is then no apparent need to explicitly consider an L(0) that is free of A. (Indeed, it is even common for Bayesians to introduce artificial nuisance parameters to simplify the Monte Carlo process.)
There are, nevertheless, several uses of L(0) in Bayesian analysis, which we list here. 
ADVANTAGES OF INTEGRATED LIKELIHOOD
Once one departs from the pure subjective Bayesian position, one cannot argue for integrated likelihood solely on grounds of rationality or co-herency. Here we present a mix of pragmatic and foundational arguments in support of integrated likelihood. Other advantages will be discussed as we proceed.
Integration Versus Maximization
Most of the nonintegration methods are based on some type of maximization over the nuisance parameter. This can be very misleading if the likelihood has a sharp "ridge," in that the likelihood along this ridge (which would typically be that obtained by maximization) may be quite atypical of the likelihood elsewhere. Here is a simple example. Here 0 and A are unknown, with 0 the parameter of interest. The joint density for X = (XI, . . . , X,) and Y is where : is the sample mean. For n = 1 and the data x = 1, y = 0, the overall likelihood L(0, A) = f (1,010, A) is graphed in Figure 2 for 6 > 0. Note the sharp ridge.
The profile likelihood is easy to compute, since the conditional mle for A is just A, = y. Thus ignoring factors that do not involve 0. Note that this is a very strange "likelihood," rapidly growing to infinity as 0 + w or 0 + -w, depending on the sign of x.
In contrast, the uniform integrated likelihood is which is clearly proportional to a N(:, l l n ) distribution, just as if Y with its entirely unknown mean A had not been observed. These two likelihoods would, of course, give completely different impressions as to the location of 6. The integrated likelihood answer can also be produced by a classical conditionalist. One can obtain the marginal likelihood for X by integrating out Y; the answer is clearly LU(0). There would thus be little disagreement as to the "correct" answer here, but the example does serve to indicate the danger inherent in maximization. 
Accounting for Nuisance Parameter Uncertainty
The profile approach of replacing A by its conditional mle, A,, would appear to be dangerous in that it ignores the uncertainty in A. Example 1 demonstrates a very mild version of this problem; the profile likelihood has one more "degree of freedom" than it should, given the replacement of p by T . We will mention a more serious standard example of this in Section 3.4, but do not dwell on the issue because it is a well-recognized problem. Indeed, many of the modifications to profile likelihood that have been advanced have, as one of their primary goals, adjustments to account for nuisance parameter uncertainty. It is important to emphasize that such modifications can be crucial, especially because "raw" likelihood procedures will typically be anticonservative, erring on the side of suggesting more accuracy than is actually warranted. Among the many disturbing examples of this is the exponential regression model (see discussion in Ye and Berger, 1991 , and the references therein). In contrast, integration methods automatically incorporate nuisance parameter uncertainty, in the sense that an integrated likelihood is an average over all the possible conditional likelihoods given the nuisance parameter. We do not claim that (default) integration methods are guaranteed to incorporate nuisance parameter uncertainty in a satisfactory way, but they certainly appear more naturally capable of doing so. As a final comment, note that if the conditional likelihoods do not vary significantly as the nuisance parameter A changes, then the integrated likelihoods will be very insensitive to choice of ~(A18).
Simplicity and Generality
In comparing the simplicity of integration versus likelihood methods, it is difficult to draw firm conclusions because of the wide range of possible methods under each label. For instance, the profile likelihood in (2) is very simple to use while, on the integration side, the simplest is the uniformintegrated likelihood in (1).The various adjusted profile likelihoods and marginal likelihoods form an array of likelihood methods of modest to great complexity. Correspondingly, "optimal" integrated likelihoods can require difficult developments of noninformative priors. Computational considerations also come into play, although the historical wisdom that Bayesian computations are harder has today been reversed by the advent of MCMC computational techniques.
The key to comparison is judging the quality of the answers relative to the simplicity of the method. For instance, comparison at the simplest level, profile versus uniform-integrated likelihood, convinces many that the latter is considerably more effective in producing good answers in practice. Not many comparisons have been done at higher levels of complexity (Liseo, 1993, and Reid, 1996, are exceptions) .
A few general observations are worth mentioning. First, integration methods are all based on the same basic idea; the only difference is in the prior distribution used to perform the integration. In contrast, the various profile, conditional and marginal likelihood approaches are based on very different rationales, and obtaining a feel for when each approach should be applied is not easy.
Second, the default Bayesian approaches have lately been used, with apparently great success, on a very large variety of complex applied problems. There are fewer successes in complex applied problems for the likelihood methods. This could, of course, be due to other factors, but is not irrelevant in terms of judging effectiveness versus difficulty.
A second relevant issue is generality of application. Likelihood methods are well known to have difficulties with nonregular problems, such as problems where the parameter is restricted to a certain range and the sample size is modest (so that likelihood surfaces can have strange shapes). Even worse is when the range restriction is affected by the data (e.g., a model where xi > 8, i = 1 , .. . , n), in which case standard asymptotics do not apply (BarndorffNielsen, 1991) .
Another very difficult class of problems for likelihood methods is the Gleser-Hwang class, discussed in Section 5.1. A third difficult class is that consisting of problems involving discrete data and especially discrete parameters. These are "difficult" because the discreteness very much reduces the possibility of developing reasonable "adjustments" when basic methods are unreasonable. Here is a classic illustration.
EXAMPLE
( N , p). Consider inde-4. Binomial k pendent success counts s = ( s l , .. ., sK) from a binomial distribution with unknown parameters ( N , p), and assume that N is the parameter of interest with p a nuisance parameter. This problem has been discussed in Draper and Guttman (1971), Carroll and Lombard (1985) , Kahn (1987) , Raftery (1988) , Aitkin and Stasinopoulas (1989) , Lavine and Wasserman (1992) and the references therein. Most of the points we make have already been made, in some form, in these articles.
The likelihood function is where T = C k j=l s j and s, ,
hood is difficult to deal with by likelihood methods. For instance, the profile likelihood is and a "natural" conditional likelihood, the conditional distribution of (sl, . . .,sk) given T and N , is
For the data set s = (16, 18, 22, 25, 27) , Figure 3 gives the graphs of L(N) and L~( N ) . The uniform integrated likelihood is This is also graphed in Figure 3 and appears to be much more useful than either L(N) or LC(N). There is more to be said here, and we will return to this example several times.
Sensitivity Analysis
One of the considerable strengths of using integrated likelihood is that one has a readily available sensitivity analysis: simply vary .rr(A19), and see how L*(9) varies. This can be crucial in evaluating the robustness of the answer. Also, if considerable sensitivity is discovered, it is often possible to determine which features of .rr(A19) are especially crucial, enabling either subjective elicitation of these features or the identification of additional data that could be collected to reduce sensitivity. EXAMPLE 4 (Continued). Use of LU(9) corresponds to choice of a U(0,l) prior distribution for p. Another common noninformative prior is the Jeffreys prior, ~( p ) a pP1l2(1-p)-lI2, which will yield an integrated likelihood we denote by LJ(9).
FIG. 3. Likelihoods for N : is the profile; LC is the conditional; LU is the unifo,rm-integrated and L J is the Jeffreys-integrated.
More generally, one could consider Beta (a, a) prior densities for p; note that a = 1 and a = 112 yield the uniform and Jeffreys priors, respectively. Calculation yields, for the integrated likelihood with a Beta (a, a ) prior for p, where c, is the prior normalization constant c, = r(2a)1(r(a>)~.
We also graph LJ(N) = L1I2(N) in Figure 3 ; La(N) for 112 < a < 1can be shown to lie between LJ(N) and L~( N ) = L1(N), so that sensitivity over this range can be judged effectively simply by comparing LJ and LU. A useful general result here is that (in the example),
so that the main difference is the more quickly decreasing tail of LU. It is worth emphasizing that all these reasonable "default" integrated likelihoods have tails that are considerably sharper than that of L(N) [or LC(N) l, indicating that the extremely flat tail of L(N) may be due to a "ridge" effect.
We later discuss the question of how to use integrated likelihoods. For now, we simply report the modes of LU(8) and LJ(8) for the data sl = (16, 18, 22, 25, 27) , along with those of L(8) and LC(8). Table 1gives these modes along with the corresponding modes for two other data sets, s, = (16, 18, 22, 25, 28) and s3= (16, 18, 22, 25, 26) . (The reason for considering such perturbations is that small errors in collection of count data such as these are almost inevitable, and one hopes the answer is not overly sensitive to such errors.) While modes alone are surely insufficient as a summary of likelihoods, the stability of those for the integrated likelihoods, over both change in the prior and small perturbations in the data, is quite appealing. For considerably more complete discussion of sensitivity of integrated likelihood in this problem, see Lavine and Wasserman (1992) . We also should mention that sensitivity analysis of other types is certainly possible; see Olkin, Petkau and Zidek (1981) for an illustration.
INTERPRETATION AND USE OF INTEGRATED LIKELIHOOD
Since we are proposing use of integrated likelihood in general, and not only within the Bayesian paradigm, we need to discuss how it is to be interpreted and used. We discuss, in order, its use in likelihood analysis, Bayesian analysis and empirical Bayes analysis. Note that, of course, one might simply report the entire integrated likelihood function, leaving its interpretation and use to the consumer.
Use in Likelihood Analysis
Those likelihood methods which operate solely on the given L(8) can also be used with an integrated likelihood. Examples of such methods are (1)using the mode, 8, of L(8) as the estimate of 8; and (2) using (if 8 is a p-dimensional vector)
as an approximate 100(1-a)% confidence set for 6, where XE(l -a ) is the (1 -a)th quantile of the chisquared distribution with p degrees of freedom. The arguments which justify such methods for profile or modified profile likelihoods will typically also apply to integrated likelihoods (and can apply in more generality; see Sweeting, 1995a, b) . Example 4 in Section 2.4 was one illustration. The following example, which will also be used later for other purposes, is another standard example. EXAMPLE 5. Suppose that, independently for i = 1, . . . , p, X i --N(pi, 1). The parameter of interest is
The usual choice of nuisance parameter here is h = p/IpI, that is, the "direction" of p in RP. Note that h can also be viewed as a point on the surface of the unit ball in RP; hence it is natural to assign h the uniform prior on this surface. The resulting uniform-integrated likelihood (see Chang and Eaves, 1990 or Berger, Philippe and Robert, where 1x1 = ( E e l x!)1/2 and I, is the modified Bessel function of the first type of order u.
For large p and assuming that 8 stays bounded as p + m, it can be shown that the mode of (19) is approximately This is a sensible estimate. For instance, since ( x I 2 / p-E X I 2 / p ) + 0 as p + m by the law of large numbers, it is immediate that 8-8 + 0. Thus 8 is consistent for 8.
In contrast, the profile likelihood does not yield a consistent estimator. Indeed, the profile likelihood for this problem can easily be seen to be which has mode 6 = I X ' /~. Clearly 8 -8 + 1,establishing the inconsistency. (There do exist "classical" methods which would yield reasonable answers. One such is to look at the marginal distribution of Gel x!,which is a noncentral chi-square distribution with parameter p8; the resulting likelihood, though complicated, will behave reasonably.)
Use in Bayesian Analysis
It is natural to seek to use an integrated likelihood, L(8), via the Bayesian approach of choosing a prior distribution, ~( 8 ) ,
for the parameter of interest and obtaining the posterior distribution This is completely legitimate when ~( h l 8 ) is a proper distribution, as observed in Section 1.3.2. When r ( h 8 ) is improper, however, certain incoherencies such as marginalization paradoxes (Dawid, Stone and Zidek, 1973) can creep in, making this practice questionable. Fortunately, the practical effect of such incoherencies appears to be minor, and they can be minimized by appropriate choice of r(hl8) [and r(O)l, such as the "reference prior" (see Section 4.4).
In Section 1.3.3, we listed some of the ways in which L(8) can be of direct value to a Bayesian. There is an additional, rather subtle but important, reason for Bayesians to consider approaching the problem through integrated likelihood: one is considerably less likely to make a damaging mistake through use of improper prior distributions. EXAMPLE 5 (Continued). Bayesians need not classify parameters as interesting or nuisance. Indeed, the common "naive" default Bayesian approach to this problem would be to base inference on the noninformative prior r ( p ) = 1 for p = (p, . . . , pp); the resulting posterior distribution, given x = (xl, . . . ,x,), is If, now, one is interested in 6 = (Cr=l p!)lP, one can easily determine the posterior distribution r(8lx) for 8, since, from (22), p8 has a noncentral chi-square distribution with p degrees of freedom and noncentrality parameter xi2 = Cf=l x:. This posterior for 6 is "bad." For instance, a common estimate of 8 is the posterior mean, which here would be 8 = + 1. This is badly inconsistent as p + oo,in the sense that 6 -8 + 2. The posterior median and posterior mode also exhibit this behavior.
Thinking in terms of 6 and the nuisance parameters h in Section 3.1 avoided this problem. It was "obvious" to use the uniform distribution on h to integrate out the nuisance parameters, and the ensuing integrated likelihood in (19) will work well with any sensible ~( 8 ) .
The "error" in use of r ( p ) = 1 above can be seen by changing variables to (8, A). Then r ( p ) = 1is transformed into where r ( h / 8) is the uniform distribution on the surface of the unit ball, as before. Thus, ~( p ) = 1has unwittingly introduced a drastic and unreasonable prior distribution on 8. Separately considering h and 8, through integrated likelihood, can help to avoid this type of error. (It should be noted that sophisticated default Bayesian approaches, such as the reference prior approach, automatically avoid this type of error; hence formal consideration of integrated likelihood is not strictly necessary if reference priors are employed.)
We have not discussed which priors r ( 8 ) should be used with L(8). Subjective choices, when available, are to be encouraged. Default choices and examples of the possible importance of the choice are discussed in Section 5.1.
Use in Empirical Bayes Analysis
In a variety of situations, including empirical Bayes analysis, it is common to estimate nuisance parameters using integrated likelihood and then to replace them in the likelihood with their estimates. This also goes under the name "Type I1 maximum likelihood" (see Good, 1983) . We content ourselves here with an example. EXAMPLE 2 (Continued). Suppose now that 0 = p = (p, . . . , pp) is of interest, with nuisance parameter A = (5, r2). The joint "likelihood" of all parameters is which already includes the given prior distribution, .rr(pl(, r2). In any case, to eliminate 5 and r2 the standard method is to form the integrated likelihood from ( 7 ) , least better than using profile likelihood. Indeed, the profile likelihood can be easily seen to be It is hard to know what to do with L(0); the first term has a singularity along the line p = (c, c, . . . , c), and it is far from clear which, if any, of the other modes are reasonable.
VERSIONS OF INTEGRATED LIKELIHOOD
As mentioned in the introduction, any conditional prior density ~( h 0 ) can be used to define an integrated likelihood. In this section, we review the more common choices of default or noninformative
conditional priors and discuss their strengths and 1.
weaknesses.
estimate (5, r2) by the mode and plug back into (23). After simplification, the result is where v = .i2/(1+ .i2) and mi
This is actually typically interpreted directly as the posterior distribution of p. Bayesians would argue that a superior approach is to integrate directly, [note that it would be incorrect to use the conditional prior a(Al0) here, since L(0, A) already contains .rr(OlA) as the second factor in (23); only the marginal prior for A is still needed]. A common choice for T(A) is .rr(A) = ~( 5 , 1 [although r2) = Berger and Strawderman, 1996, suggest that ~( 5 , = ( I + r2)-I is better]. In a sense, the super2) riority of (25) over (24) is almost obvious, since (e.g.) if .i2 = 0, then v = 0 and mi = T , so that (24) would imply that all pi = 1 with absolute certainty. This is another example of the potential inadequacy of failing to incorporate the uncertainty in nuisance parameters.
Although the direct integrated likelihood in (25) is arguably superior to (24), it is worth noting that estimation of A in L(0, A) by Type I1 MLE is at
Proper Conditional Priors
When ~( h l 0 ) is naturally a proper conditional density, certain of the concerns with interpreting and using the resulting integrated likelihood disappear. In particular, the resulting integrated likelihood can unambiguously be interpreted as a likelihood and can be combined with any (proper) prior density for 0 to produce a true posterior. Example 5 provides an illustration of this, with a(A0)-the uniform distribution on the sphere of rotations-clearly being proper. Example 4 offers another illustration, with both the Jeffreys and the uniform distributions proper on the unit interval.
Today it is popular, for computational reasons, to use "vague" proper priors (often "vague" conjugate priors). Unfortunately, the use of such does not really provide protection against the concerns that arise with use of improper conditional priors; if a difficulty would arise in using an improper conditional prior, the same difficulty would manifest itself through great sensitivity to the degree of "vagueness" chosen.
Uniform Conditional Prior
The uniform choice of .rr(A/ 0) = 1has already been mentioned in the introduction and in several of the examples. It is still the most commonly used default conditional prior and is an attractive choice when nothing else is available. (When h is a vector, many even prefer the uniform prior to the Jeffreys prior because of concerns with the behavior of the Jeffreys prior in higher dimensions.) There are, however, well-documented difficulties with the uniform prior, perhaps the most well known being its lack of invariance to reparameterization. (Using the uniform prior for a positive parameter A will yield a different integrated likelihood than using the uniform prior for its logarithm A* = log A, for example.) While this tends not to be a serious issue in practice (Laplace, 1812 , suggested that parameterization~are typically chosen so that a uniform prior is reasonable), it does suggest that a uniform prior cannot be the final answer.
A more serious potential problem with the uniform conditional prior is that the resulting integrated likelihood may not exist. Here is a simple example. EXAMPLE 6. Suppose X I and X2 are independent N(0, a 2 ) and the uniform prior .rr(a210) = 1is used for the nuisance parameter a2.Then
In contrast, use of the usual conditional prior .rr(a2)8) = 1/u2 (see Section 4.4) would yield Interestingly, this latter integrated likelihood coincides with the profile likelihood and with the marginal likelihood.
Right Haar Measure
If f(x18, A) is invariant with respect to an amenable group whose action on the parameter space leaves 8 unchanged, then the compelling choice for v(Al8) is the induced right invariant Haar density for A (see Berger, 1985, and Eaton, 1989, for definitions) . Virtually all default Bayesian methods recommend this conditional prior, as do various "structural" and even frequentist approaches. EXAMPLE 1(Continued). The model is invariant under a location shift, and the right invariant Haar density for 8 is the uniform density .rr(81a2) = 1.
EXAMPLE 5 (Continued). The model is invariant under rotations of x and y , and the rotation group leaves 0 = lyI2/p unchanged. The right invariant Haar density (actually the Haar density here, since the rotation group is compact and hence unimodular) induced on A = y/lyl is the uniform density on the unit sphere discussed in Section 3.1.
For formal discussion and other examples of use of the right Haar density as the conditional prior, see Chang and Eaves (1990) and Datta and Ghosh (1995a) . The chief limitation of this approach is the rarity of suitable invariance. A secondary limitation is that, if the group is not amenable, use of the resulting right Haar density can be problematical.
Conditional Reference Integrated Likelihood
The reference prior algorithm (Bernardo, 1979; Bernardo, 1989, 1992; Bernardo and Smith, 1994 ) is a quite general and powerful tool for obtaining "automatic" priors to be used in Bayesian analysis. It is motivated by trying to find that prior distribution which is least informative, in the sense of maximizing (in an asymptotic sense) the expected Kullback-Liebler divergence between the prior distribution and the posterior distribution. (Intuitively, such a prior distribution allows the data to "speak most loudly.") The reference prior is typically the same as the Jeffreys prior in the one-dimensional case; when the parameter space is multivariate, the reference algorithm takes into account the order of inferential importance of the parameters, by partitioning the parameter vector w = (wl, w2, . . . , u p ) into several blocks of decreasing interest to the investigator. Berger and Bernardo suggest using the one-at-time reference prior which corresponds to partitioning w into p one-dimensional blocks.
Since the reference prior depends on which parameters are of primary interest, it is usually different from the Jeffreys prior. In numerous multivariate examples, it has been shown to perform considerably better than the Jeffreys prior. Also, it seems to typically yield procedures with excellent frequentist properties (Ghosh and Mukerjee, 1992; Liseo, 1993; Sun, 1994; Datta and Ghosh, 1995a, b) .
In the standard Bayesian approach, the reference prior is used to produce the joint posterior distribution for (8, A); then A is integrated out to obtain the marginal posterior for 8. In this approach, there is no need to develop the notion of a likelihood for 8. Indeed, any attempt to do so directly, via an expression such as (lo), is made difficult by the typical impropriety of reference priors; one cannot define conditional and marginal distributions directly from an improper distribution.
Therefore, to produce a reference-integrated likelihood, we need to slightly modify the reference prior algorithm. In this paper, we only discuss the "two groups" case, where the parameter vector is split in the parameters of interest, 8, and the nuisance parameters, A; extensions to several groups is immediate. For simplicity of notation, we will take 8 and A to be scalars.
Under certain regularity conditions (see, e.g., Bernardo and Smith, 1994) , basically the existence of a consistent and asymptotically normal estimator of the parameters, the reference prior for A, when 0 is known, is defined to be where 122(8, A) is the lower right corner of the expected Fisher information matrix. Since direct use of this, as in (lo), to obtain an integrated likelihood is problematical due to its typical impropriety (Basu, 1977) , we employ the idea of the Berger and Bernardo (1992) reference prior algorithm and consider a sequence of nested subsets of R = O x A, R1, R2, . . ., increasing to R and over which (28) can be normalized; then the conditional reference prior, and associated integrated likelihood, will be defined as the appropriate limit. Indeed, defining Am(0) = {A: (0, A) E R,} and the normalizing constant over this compact set as Km (0) This definition of the conditional reference prior can be shown to be consistent with the definition of the joint reference prior .rrR(O, A) in Berger and Bernardo (1992) , providing the joint reference prior exists and (30) holds, in the sense that then for some function .rrR(0). We will then define .rrR(0) to be the marginal reference prior for 0. The conditional reference prior can be shown to share many of the desirable properties of the joint reference prior, such as invariance to reparameterization of the nuisance parameters. Note that this conditional reference prior was also considered in Sun and Berger (1998) , although for different purposes. 
G)~]
where 36 is the sample mean and D2 = C x;/n.
[Note, also, that the problem is invariant to scale changes, and n(A I 6) = l / A is the resulting right (27) . Of course, with three or more observations, LU(6) would also be finite here, but the example is indicative of the commonly observed phenomenon that reference priors virtually always yield finite integrated likelihoods, while the uniform prior may not.
Other Integrated Likelihoods
In one sense, there are as many integrated likelihoods as there are priors. For instance, any method which yields a noninformative prior, nN(6, A), leads to an integrated "likelihood Since nN(6, A) is a joint prior distribution on both 6 and A, however, this is not formally in the spirit of (3); equation (36) would actually yield the proposed marginal posterior distribution for 6 and must be normalized by dividing by the marginal nN(6) = J nN(6, A) dA (if finite) to yield a likelihood.
Reference noninformative priors offer a ready solution to this dilemma, since-the reference prior algorithm itself suggested a suitable nR(A16) for use in (3). While it is easy to normalize proper priors correctly, other noninformative priors are more difficult to modify to produce an integrated likelihood. We illustrate the possibility by considering how to modify the Jeffreys prior approach to yield an integrated likelihood, since the Jeffreys prior is probably the most widely used default prior distribution. (The motivation for the Jeffreys prior can be found in Jeffreys, 1961 , and was primarily the desire to construct default priors such that the resulting Bayesian answers are invariant under reparameterization.)
The Jeffreys prior for (6, A) is where I(6, A) is the expected Fisher information matrix. To obtain a reasonable nJ(h16), perhaps the most natural option is to simply treat 6 as given, and derive the Jeffreys prior for A with 6 given. It is easy to see that the result would be (37) n*(A I 6) a Jdet(lzz(6, A)), where 122(6, A) is the corner of I(6, A) corresponding to the information about A. This, however, also has ambiguities. In Example 7, for instance, we found from (34) that n*(AlO) a A -l d w -but, since 6 is now to be viewed as given, the factor 4-is just a proportionality constant which can be ignored (the problem does not arise for proper priors, since such a factor would disappear in the normalizing process).
The net result of this reasoning suggests that the correct definition of nJ(A16) is as given in (37), but ignoring any multiplicative factors which only involve 6. Thus, in Example 7, we would obtain nJ(h16) = l / A which is the same as nR(A16). We have not explored the quality of integrated likelihoods based on nJ(A16), but suspect that they would typically be satisfactory.
The other prominently studied default priors are the probability matching priors, designed to produce Bayesian credible sets which are optimal frequentist confidence sets in a certain asymptotic sense. Literature concerning these priors can be accessed through the recent papers by Berger, Philippe and Robert (1998), Datta and Ghosh (1995a,b) and Ghosh and Mukerjee (1992) . We have not explored the use of these priors in defining integrated likelihood.
LIMITATIONS OF INTEGRATED LIKELIHOOD

The Posterior Distribution Mav Be Needed
As in the univariate case without nuisance parameters, the integrated likelihood function contains the information provided by the data (filtered by the conditional prior on A) and often can be used directly for inferential purposes. In some cases, however, L*(6) needs to be augmented by a prior distribution for 6 (possibly noninformative), yielding a posterior distribution for 6, before it can serve as a basis for inference. (We are envisaging that the posterior distribution would be used in ordinary Bayesian ways, to construct error estimates, credible sets, etc.) EXAMPLE 4 (Continued). In Section 2.4, we used only the modes of LU(N) and LJ(N) as point estimates for N. How can we do more, for example, convey the precision of the estimates?
Classical approaches have not made much headway with this problem, and the "standard noninformative prior Bayesian approach also fails. 
FIG. 4. Posterior distributions proportional to L U ( N ) r l ( N ) , L J ( N ) r l ( N ) , L U ( N ) 7 i z (~) and L J ( N ) 7 i z ( N ) .
The standard noninformative prior for N would be v ( N ) = 1.But La(N) behaves like cNPa for large N (see Kahn, 1987) , as does the resulting posterior, so for a 5 1 the posterior will be improper and Bayesian analysis cannot succeed. (In a sense the difficulty here is that sophisticated noninformative prior methodology does not really exist for discrete N; see the next example for an illustration of what such methodology can do for a continuous parameter.) Subjective Bayesians would argue the importance of introducing proper subjective prior distributions here, and it is hard to disagree. This could be done either by keeping the (vague) rr(N) = 1,but introducing a Beta (a, b) prior for 0 with a > 1(in which case Kahn, 1987 , can be used to show that the posterior is proper), or by choosing an appropriately decreasing v(N).
One could still, however, argue for the benefits of having a default or conventional analysis available for the problem. To go along with the default LU(N) or LJ(N) [see (16) and (17)1, one might consider, as default priors, either rrl(N) = 1 / N (Raftery, 1988; Moreno and Giron, 1995; de Alba and Mendoza, 1996) or the Rissanen (1983) prior possible proper prior. Both rrl and 9can easily be shown to yield proper posteriors when paired with either L'(N) or LJ(N). Figure 4 shows the four resulting posterior distributions for the data s = (16, 18, 22, 25, 27) .
Inferential conclusions are straightforward from these proper posteriors. For instance, the quartiles of the four posteriors are given in Table 2 . (Providing quartiles is more reasonable than providing moments when, as here, the distributions have large and uncertain tails.)
Compare this with the much more limited (and questionable) inferences provided in Table 1 .While the answers in Table 2 vary enough that a subjective Bayesian analysis might be deemed by many to be necessary, a case could also be made for choosing, as a conventional analysis, the Luvl or LJrr2 posterior distributions.
The Gleser-Hwang class. Example 4 is a rather special situation, because the parameter is discrete. However, similar phenomena occur for a large where log(O1(~) =N and log('+')(^) = log ~o~(~) ( N ) , with k N the largest integer such that log('^)(^) > class of problems, which includes Fieller's problem, errors-in-variables models, and calibration models. We begin discussion of this class by presenting an example and then discuss the characterization of the class given by Gleser and Hwang (1987) .
EXAMPLE 7 (Continued). The use of the conditional reference prior, .ir(AIO) oc 1/A, for the nuisance parameter A = a in the coefficient of variation problem leads to the integrated likelihood (35). It can be easily seen that this likelihood does not go to zero as 161 goes to infinity, making direct inferential use of LR(6) difficult. To progress, one can bring in the marginal reference prior This leads to the reference posterior distribution,
which, interestingly, is proper, and hence can be used for inference. This is an example of the rather amazing property of reference (and Jeffreys) priors that they virtually always seem to yield proper posterior distributions, at least in the continuous parameter case. Of course, one might object to using (39) for inference, either because a Bayesian analysis is not wanted or because the introduction of the reference prior seems rather arbitrary. Indeed, it is difficult to come up with auxiliary supporting arguments for use of the reference prior here. For instance, the resulting Bayesian inferences will often not have particularly good frequentist properties, which is one of the commonly used arguments in support of reference priors.
It is important, however, to place matters in perspective. For this situation, there simply are no methods of "objective" inference that will be viewed as broadly satisfactory. Consider likelihood methods, for instance. The profile likelihood for 6 can be shown to be constant. The correction factor for the profile likelihood given by the Cox-Reid (1987) method (see the Appendix) yields the conditional profile likelihood LC (6) It is easy to see that this, too, is asymptotically constant.
The similarities between the three different likelihoods [LR(6), L(6) and LC(6)l are better appreciated in the special case where : = 0 and D = 1.
These are graphed in Figure 5 , along with .irR(6Jx). Note that the conditional profile likelihood is virtually indistinguishable from the other likelihoods. There is no appealing way to use these likelihoods for inference.
Frequentists might argue that this simply reveals that no type of likelihood or Bayesian argument is appealing for this example. However, frequentist conclusions are also very problematical here, since this example falls within the class of problems, identified in Gleser and Hwang (1987) , where frequentist confidence procedures must be infinite sets (and often the whole parameter space) with positive probability. [Saying that a 95% confidence set is (-oo, oo) is not particularly appealing]. First, we restate the Gleser and Hwang result in our notation.
THEOREM 1 (Gleser and Hwang, 1987) . Consider a two parameter model with sampling density f (XI 6, A), 6 E 0, A E A, on the sample space X.Suppose there exists a subset @* of @ and a value of A* in the closure of A such that 6 has an unbounded range over @* and such that for each fixed 6 E O* and x E X , lim f(x I 6, A) = f(x I A*)
exists, is a density on X and is independent of 6.
[ 4 2 g2(x,6) I Then every confidence procedure C(X) for 6 with where g(x, 6) = -T + (sgn6)Jx2 +4D202. ~t is easy positive confidence level 1-a will yield infinite sets to see that, as 101 + oo, this approaches a positive with positive probability. To show that Example 7 is an example of this type, we must slightly generalize Theorem 1,as follows. The proof in Gleser and Hwang (1987) can be followed exactly, using the new condition in obvious places. (43) is satisfied. Hence frequentist confidence sets must be infinite with positive probability.
Another interesting fact is that the class of densities satisfying (43) appears to be related to the class of densities for which the profile likelihood does not go to zero at infinity. Recall that this class of densities, which are very problematic from either a likelihood or a frequentist perspective, includes a number of important problems (in addition to the coefficient of variation problem) such as Fieller's problem, errors-in-variables models and calibration models. One can make a convincing argument that such problems are simply not amenable to any "objective" analysis; prior information is crucial and must be utilized. If, however, one is unwilling or unable to carry out a true subjective Bayesian analysis, then a case can be made for having standard "default" analyses available. The Bayesian analyses with reference noninformative priors, such as that leading to .irR(Olx) in Example 7, are arguably the best candidates for such "default" analyses.
Visualization. We have argued that, for certain important classes of problems, inference appears impossible based on L(0) alone. A counterargument is sometimes advanced, to the effect that formal inference is not necessary; it may suffice simply to present L(0) itself as the conclusion, with consumers learning to interpret likelihood functions directly.
One difficulty with this argument is that likelihood functions can appear very different, depending on the parameterization used. EXAMPLE 7 (Continued). The conditional reference likelihood, LR(0), for : = 1, n = 2 and D = 2, is presented in Figure 6a . Suppose, instead, that the parameterization 6 = 0/(1+ 101) had been used. The conditional reference likelihood for 5 can then easily be seen to be which is plotted in Figure 6b over (-1, I ), the range of 5. Visually, ER([) and LR(0) appear to convey markedly different information: for ZR(5) the "local" mode appears to dominate, while for LR(0) it appears to be insignificant relative to the huge tail. Yet these two functions clearly reflect the same information.
Introducing 4 0 ) removes this difficulty [providing that the method used for obtaining 4 0 ) is invariant under reparameterization of 01, because the Jacobian will correct for the influence of the change of variables. Subjective priors will be suitably invariant, as are the Jeffreys and reference priors (see Datta and Ghosh, 1996) . Figure 7a and 7b graphs these two posteriors for the same situation as in Figure 6 . These seem to be visually satisfactory, in the sense of conveying similar information.
One possibility for "correcting" likelihoods to prevent this visualization problem is to mimic the Bayesian approach by including a "Jacobian" term to account for reparameterization. Various suggestions to this effect have been put forth in the likelihood literature, from time to time, but none seem to have caught on.
Premature Elimination of Nuisance Parameters
Any summary reduction of data runs the risk of losing information that might later be needed, and nuisance parameter elimination is no exception. We review a few of the ways in which this loss of information can occur. The most basic situation that can cause problems is if more data are later to be observed. EXAMPLE 1(Continued). Defining S:= C:="=,xi -)~/ n , the uniform integrated likelihood for a2was L?(a2) cx a-(n-l) exp{-ns:/2a2).
Suppose additional data . . . ,xn+, available. x~+~, become The corresponding uniform integrated likelihood for a2 from these data alone is L?(a2) cx a-(m-l) exp{-rn Si/2a2), with Si being the corresponding sum of square deviations. To find the overall likelihood for a 2 , it is tempting to multiply ~y ( a~) since the two data sets were and L:(a2), independent (given the parameters). Note, however, that, if all the data were available to us, we would use the integrated likelihood where S$is the overall sum of square deviations, and this is not the product of L? and L?. A second type of loss of information can occur in meta-analysis, where related studies are analyzed.
EXAMPLE
ex-2 (Continued). We generalize this ample slightly, supposing the observations to be Xij -N(pi, a:), j = 1 , .. . ,ni and i = 1 , .. . ,p.
Of interest here are the study-specific pi or the overall (6, r2), where pi -N(5, r2), i = 1 , .. .,p. If the a? were completely unrelated, such an analknown), in that the sufficient statistics ni,xi and ysis would be reasonable. Typically, however, the a?
S: can all be found from (44). But one would have would themselves be closely related, as in Hui and to use these sufficient statistics to reconstruct the Berger (1983) , and their "independent" elimination full likelihood and not use the L R (~~) directly.
by integration would then not be appropriate. Interestingly, in this situation the original likelihood A third situation in which one should not use an can be recovered (assuming the original model is integrated likelihood for 6 is when prior informa- tion is available in the form of a conditional prior While one should be aware of the potential probdistribution ~( 0 l h ) .
If h is first eliminated from the lems in premature elimination of nuisance paramlikelihood, then one cannot subsequently make use eters, the situation should be kept in perspective. of ~(01A). [One possible default treatment of this sitProblems arise only if the nuisance parameters conuation is described in Sun and Berger (1998) : first tain a significant amount of information about how find the reference marginal prior for A, based on the data relate to the quantities of interest; in such 401 A), and then find the resulting posterior for 0.1 a situation one should delay integrating away the nuisance parameters as long as possible. In the examples discussed above, however, the nuisance parameters hold little enough information about the quantities of interest that the answers obtained by simply multiplying the integrated likelihoods are reasonably close to the answers from the "correct" likelihood. Indeed, much of statistical practice can be viewed as formally or informally eliminating nuisance parameters at different stages of the analysis, then multiplying the resulting likelihoods. The trick is to recognize when this is a reasonable approximation and when it is not.
APPENDIX
To derive a conditional profile likelihood for the coefficient of variation in Example 7, one first needs to obtain an orthogonal parameterization. It can be shown that 6 = (J2a2 + p2)-1 is orthogonal to 6. Cox and Reid (1987) (3) is extended to allow data dependent priors, without the initial random effects assumption as a part of the model. Random effects integrated likelihoods incorporate information about the nuisance parameters directly and usually provide estimates of the parameter of interest that are consistent for most (in the almost sure sense) sequences of nuisance parameters that could be generated from the random effects distribution (Kiefer and Wolfowitz, 1956 ; for a dscussion about efficiency issues see also Lindsay, 1980) . As a different example of the use of random effects integrated likelihoods, consider Example 5. The problems associated with the use of profile likelihood methods appear to be due to the relatively large number of nuisance parameters. A random effects assumption seems natural here given the parameter of interest. Consider the same random effects model as in Example 2: the pi are i.i.d. N(5, r 2 ) .In this case, A = (5, r), and 0 is a random variable (0* in the notation of Section 1.3.1). The authors' recommendation of (6) as a likelihood in this setting is closely connected with the discussion about empirical Bayes methods in Section 3.3. If (6) is taken as the likelihood, the profile likelihood for 0 = C p!/P would be obtained by substituting an estimate ;i, into (6). It is more common to substitute an estimate of the A based upon the likelihood for A: the function of A obtained by integrating over 0* in (6). In this case the estimate for A is Substituting this estimate of into (6) gives an integrated likelihood that is proportional to an estimate Rejoinder of the conditional density of 0 given the observed data. Since the pilx are independently N(mi, u), where v = t2/(1+ t2) and mi = vxi + (1 -v)X, the estimate of the conditional distribution for p0/v is a noncentral X 2 distribution with p degrees of freedom and noncentrality parameter v-' C m!/2. The additional random effects assumption is used in the above derivation but, even with the the original assumption that the pi are a fixed sequence, assuming that 0 converges to a limit, one can show that this conditional distribution converges to a point mass at this limit.
Statistical models with a large number of nuisance parameters arise frequently and profile likelihoods for these models often give unreasonable parameter of interest inferences. Often a natural alternative to a model with a large number of nuisance parameters is a random effects or mixture model. The analysis arising from the use of a random effects model can be viewed as an integrated likelihood method and frequently gives reasonable parameter of interest inferences that are robust to the assumption of randomness about the nuisance parameter. In many other statistical models, profile and integrated likelihoods tend to be similar. However, in models with badly behaved likelihood contributions, as in Example 3, profile likelihoods can give unreasonable parameter of interest inferences where integrated likelihoods give reasonable solutions. In models with a large amount of uncertainty about the nuisance parameter, as in Example 4, integrated likelihoods can give misleading results. Thus the differences between the results for the two methods is informative in itself, which suggests that in important and complex problems it might be of value to integrate the two as a form of sensitivity analysis.
James 0.Berger, Brunero Liseo and Robert L. Wolpert
We thank the discussants for their considerable insights; if we don't mention particular points from their discussions, it is because we agree with those points. We begin by discussion of an issue raised by both discussants and then respond to their individual comments.
Dr. Bjornstad and Dr. Susko both express concerns about the integrated likelihood answers in the situation of estimating a binomial N in Example 4, wondering if the integrated likelihoods might lead to conclusions not supported by the data. This is a situation in which the answer does change markedly depending upon one's prior beliefs. For instance, as Dr. Susko notes, when p is small the likelihood is extremely flat out to very large values of N; thus someone who viewed small p as being likely might well find the profile likelihood more reasonable than the integrated likelihoods we favor. Conversely, someone who viewed large p as being likely would find the likelihood for N concentrated on much smaller values of N than the integrated likelihoods. Faced with this extreme dependence on prior opinions about p (or, alternately, about N ) one could thus argue that there is no "objective" answer inherent in the data, and that the profile likelihood properly reflects this whereas the integrated likelihoods do not.
Our premise, however, is that inference concerning N is to be done and that the (subjective Bayesian) analysis suggested by the above reasoning is not going to be performed. We are simply arguing that, under these circumstances, the answers obtained via the integrated likelihood route are the most reasonable default answers. This can, indeed, be given some theoretical support, if one is willing to view a default likelihood as a surrogate for an (unknown) posterior density. In Example 4, for instance, suppose we are willing to agree that the prior, though unknown, is in the very large class of priors for which p and N are a priori independent, the prior density for N is nonincreasing and the prior distribution for p is a Beta distribution symmetric about 112. Liseo and Sun (1998) have shown that the Jeffreys-integrated likelihood is closer (in a Kullback-Leibler sense) to any posterior arising from a prior in this class than is the profile likelihood. In summary, while we have no quarrel with those who "refuse to play the game" (i.e., those who refuse to give a nonsubjective answer to this problem), we do not see any better alternatives for "players" than the recommended integrated likelihood (or, even better, noninformative prior Bayesian) answers.
Reply to Dr.Bjpirnstad. We seem to be basically in agreement concerning the value of integrated likelihood and, indeed, Dr. Bjpirnstad emphasizes several of the particularly valuable features of integrated likelihood. We would add a slight qualification to his comment that the integrated likelihood approach has the desirable feature of following the likelihood principle. This is certainly true if the prior distribution is chosen independently of the model, but we recommend use of the (conditional) reference noninformative prior which can depend on the model (and not on only the observed likelihood function). In practice, however, this is just a slight violation of the likelihood principle.
Concerning the issue of choice of the prior, Dr. Bjornstad wonders if it might be worthwhile to develop a complete theory of uniform integrated likelihood, finding parameterizations in which a constant prior is reasonable. In a sense, noninformative prior theory began by following this path, but this path led to what we view as more powerful modern theories, such as the reference prior approach.
Dr. Bjornstad expresses two related concerns over the choice of the prior for integrated likelihood: the nonuniqueness of the choice and the difficulty of sophisticated choices, such as the conditional reference prior. One could define an essentially unique choice, such as the Jeffreys prior, and we would argue that such a unique choice would generally give better answers than any "unique" nonintegrated likelihood method. One can do better, however, and we see no reason not to utilize the more sophisticated choices of priors if they are available (e.g., if the possibly difficult derivation of a conditional reference prior has already been performed). We hope that, for common problems, the statistical community will eventually identify and recommend specific sophisticated priors for "standardized" use. Our comment about the possible value of having several integrated likelihoods was simply that, if one is in a new situation with no well-studied integrated likelihoods available, it can be comforting if one obtains essentially the same answer from application of several integrated likelihoods.
We do not have any definitive opinion about the weighted likelihood derived by following Harris (1989) . We are somewhat concerned with the apparent double use of the data in the definitions of L,,,(O) and L&,(O)(using the data once in the likelihood function and again in the weight function for integration). Indeed, these weighted likelihoods are somewhat hard to compute. We were able to compute L&,(O) for Example 3, and it turned out to be the same as the (inadequate) profile likelihood, which does not instill confidence in the method.
Reply to Dr.Susko. The asymptotic equivalence between profile likelihood and integrated likelihood is indeed interesting to contemplate. As the justification for use of profile likelihood is primarily asymptotic, it might be tempting for a "likelihood analyst" to view integrated likelihood as simply a tool to extend the benefits of profile likelihood to small sample situations. Interesting issues arise in any attempt to formalize this, not the least of which is the fact that (conditional) reference priors often have nonconstant h(O)in (29) and, having such, can considerably improve the performance of the integrated likelihood.
The "random effects" profile likelihood analysis considered by Dr. Susko for Example 5 is interesting. We note, first, that the actual profile likelihood is not computed but, rather, the likelihood based on the "Type I1 maximum likelihood estimates" of the nuisance parameters. Of course, as discussed in Section 3.3, we certainly support this modification. Dr. Susko mentions that the resulting "profile" likelihood yields consistent estimates of 0, even if the random effects assumption does not hold. The uniform integrated likelihood in (19) also possesses nice (frequentist) confidence properties; it would be interesting to know if the same can be said for the "profile" likelihood. Finally, deriving the "profile" likelihood here required a strong additional assumption (the random effects assumption) and two uses of integrated likelihood (first to integrate out the random effects parameters and then to obtain the Type I1 maximum likelihood estimates of the nuisance parameters). While the resulting answer may well be sensible, the direct uniform integrated likelihood in (19) seems more attractive, both in terms of the simplicity of the answer and the simplicity of the derivation.
Dr. Susko finishes by suggesting that it might be useful to compute both profile and integrated likelihood answers in application, as a type of sensitivity study. It is probably the case that, if the two answers agree, then one can feel relatively assured in the validity of the answer. It is less clear what to think in the case of disagreement, however. If the answers are relatively precise and quite different, we would simply suspect that it is a situation with a "bad" profile likelihood. On the other hand, it can be useful to know when the profile likelihood is essentially uninformative, as in Example 4. While one could argue that the same insight (and more) can be obtained by investigation of sensitivity of integrated likelihood with respect to the noninformative prior, it is certainly reasonable to look at the profile likelihood if it is available.
